We investigate the strategic impact of flexible delivery frequencies on the competition of logistics service providers (LSPs) in a supply chain. LSPs compete for customers who choose an exclusive service provider based on their individual preference, prices and inventory costs. The service provider which offers the higher delivery frequency is more attractive to customers, because inventory holding costs are kept low. In reverse, higher delivery frequencies entail higher transportation costs for the LSPs (frequency effect), which is only partially offset by a community cost effect that captures the economies of scale from larger market share and synergies from increased load efficiency. We consider a scenario in which only one of the two LSPs can choose its delivery frequency strategically. Our main result is that flexibility in frequency choice is only a strategic advantage for the LSP if customers' inventory holding costs are relatively high compared to transportation costs. In this case customers especially appreciate the high delivery frequencies and the flexible LSP is able to satisfy this demand. However, when inventory holding costs are comparably small with respect to the LSPs' transportation costs, the inflexible LSP is at an advantage. In this case, inflexibility acts as a credible strategic commitment which the flexible LSP can only react to. Furthermore, low inventory holding costs lead to a situation in which the LSP with the flexible delivery frequency faces the dilemma whether to choose its optimal delivery frequency and to make less profit than his competitor or to forfeit some of its own profits in order to make larger profits than the other LSP.
Introduction
Globalization has led to a strengthening of global competition and, as Yang, Marlow, and Lu (2009) observe, has forced logistics service providers to rethink their business service processes in order to better satisfy customers' needs. The increased competitive pressure also forces logistics customers to constantly optimize their business processes and costs, for example, by improving their production systems (Womack et al., 2007) . In particular, customers require more flexibility from their logistics service provider (LSP) so that they can adapt to new production systems, like the just-in-time or just-in-sequence production of the Toyota production system (Ohno, 1988) . Consequently, flexibility has become a critical success factor in the logistics industry and LSPs have started to offer new logistics concepts that involve high frequency deliveries (Pan et al., 2009 ). Higher deliver frequencies allow customers to reduce their stocks, which leads to lower inventory costs and expenses for capital commitment. However, higher delivery frequencies also entail higher costs for the LSP due to transport costs for longer distances and fixed stop costs. This so-called frequency effect is partially offset by another cost-reducing community effect, which results from synergies as well as economies of scale: The more demand a single logistics service provider experiences, the higher is its load efficiency. Moreover, the consolidation of several customers' orders also carries potential for increasing cost efficiency.
In this paper, we analyze the strategic impact of flexible delivery frequencies on the competition between LPSs in a supply chain under consideration of the frequency and community effects. More specifically, we develop a model in which two LSPs compete for customers' market share in prices and delivery frequency and assume that only one of the two LSPs can flexibly choose its delivery frequency. This corresponds to the current transition in logistics competition, where some of the competitors are able to choose their delivery frequency flexibly, while others are not. Furthermore, this allows us to isolate the strategic impact of flexible delivery frequency choice and to investigate whether this flexibility is indeed always more profitable for the LSPs. Indeed, our analysis shows that inflexibility in delivery can also serve as a strategic commitment and thereby secure a competitive advantage whenever the customer's inventory holding costs are not too high.
Our work is located within the time-based competition literature, which deals with situations in which customers choose logistics service providers based on price and lead time. More specifically, our model is closely related to three streams of this literature. The first stream is inventory research, which generally considers one customer who purchases goods from two or more suppliers. The customer's decision is made by criteria like price, service level and lead time. For a review of inventory management see Minner (2003) . In our model, we assume an inventory management like the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model (Harris, 1913) . However, the customers' effort to lower their inventory costs is a necessary prerequisite for their logistics provider decision, but not at the center of our analysis. Rather we focus on the aspect of competition between logistics providers, which relates to a second strand of literature that is tightly coupled with inventory research.
This second strand focuses on the impact of suppliers' competition on allocation of one customer's demand to two or more suppliers. However, contrary to our paper, this literature mainly regards the dual-sourcing problem from the customers' perspective, whereas we consider the perspective of suppliers who compete for market share. For example, Benjaafar et al. (2007) study the impact of competition on suppliers' side on customer's choice. They consider two types of allocation methods of one customer to N suppliers. Both methods only consider service competition, not price and service competition as in our case. The first method analyzes an allocation of demand shares to each supplier based on service offering. The second method examines a solesourcing case in which each supplier's probability of selection increases with the offered service level. We also consider sole-sourcing, but with a contin-uum of customers as well as price and service competition. Also Ha et al. (2003) investigate the competition of two suppliers on price and delivery frequency under an EOQ model. In contrast to our paper they only consider price or frequency competition, regarding the decision rights of price and logistics on each side of the market. The authors also examine the competition between the suppliers and the equilibrium decisions of the customer and find that higher delivery frequencies provide a competitive advantage. Compared to Ha et al., our model extends the strategic scope for logistics service providers by considering price and delivery frequency competition. Cachon and Zhang (2006) and Jin and Ryan (2009) also characterize the optimal allocation policy of one customer's demand to his suppliers by comparing several allocation mechanisms. Both articles analyze the impact of the number of suppliers on the customer's total costs and the impact of asymmetric information on suppliers' competition. While Jin and Ryan conclude that with more suppliers equilibrium prices, service levels, and customer's costs increase, the results of Cachon and Zhang show that the customer can also benefit from the information that is provided by more suppliers. Yang, Xiao, and Shen (2009) examine the allocation problem under price and service competition for one supplier and two risk averse retailers. They as well adopt the EOQ production-inventory policy in a game-theoretic model, and analyze the existence of an EOQ-equilibrium and the players' equilibrium decisions. Contrary to the present paper, which targets the role of flexibility in frequency choice, Yang et al. study the risk-sensitivity of retailers depending on capacity of the supplier and the retailer's prices, service levels and lot sizes. They conclude that the expected profit of the supplier is increasing in risk aversion and service investment efficiency and that risk sensitivity of one retailer has a negative effect on its own decisions including retail price, service level and lot size.
The third stream of time-based competition that is related to our model, also takes on the perspective of suppliers who compete for market share. Gans (2002) , for example, studies a market of N suppliers who compete on service levels. His focus is on the analysis of customers' switching behavior with respect to the service levels offered. Gans only considers services without inventory holding costs. Likewise, Allon and Federgruen (2007) analyze a general market with service facilities competing on prices and lead time under varying types of competition. They consider a queuing game with different cases of sequential or simultaneous price and waiting times selection and can show that prior knowledge of prices has no impact on the equilibrium service level choices. The authors provide that a mechanism, in which firms make their strategic decisions sequentially by selecting service levels first, results in an equilibrium with higher service levels, prices, and demand volumes. In this paper we also consider the case of sequential decision making. Service providers choose their delivery frequencies first and make their price decision in a second stage. Moreover, our model differs with respect to the presence of inventory holding costs and by the way in which the chosen service level impacts the strategic behavior of the firms. In the model of Allon and Federgruen a service level improvement by one firm results in price and demand increases for all firms. However, in our model the prices of a firm decrease as the competitor offers a higher delivery frequency.
Strategic Delivery Frequency Competition

The Model
In the following model we consider the simultaneous competition of logistics service providers (LSPs) in prices and delivery frequency. More specifically, assume a transport market that consists of two logistics service providers (LSP 1 and LSP 2 ) and a continuum of customers, x ∈ [0, 1], with unit mass in a Hotelling (1929) framework. In each period of time every costumer has a positive demand for an average of one unit of freight (e.g. one truckload), whose transportation he seeks to commission to one of the two logistics service providers. We assume that the freight contains an input to the customers' continuous production process and that it can be arbitrarily subdivided into several partial deliveries. The freight will be buffered in the customer's inventory until needed. Therefore, the demand must only be met on average over time. The delivery frequency r is a measure of the number of partial deliveries that is offered by a given LSP in one time period. A delivery frequency of r = 1 signifies that the full unit of freight is delivered all at once within each time period, whereas delivery frequencies of r = 1 signify that the LSP will deliver on average 1 r units of freight in each run, but at the same time visits the customer on average r times per time period. Of course, customers will c.p. prefer the LSP who offers the higher delivery frequency because of its ability to keep average inventory holding costs low. On the other hand, for the LSPs it is more costly to offer a higher delivery frequency.
More specifically, the profits and costs of the logistics service providers and logistics customers, respectively, as well as the nature of competition in the logistics market are as follows:
Logistics Service Providers: LSPs compete in delivery frequency r and price p. Furthermore, the LSPs are horizontally differentiated and located at each end of the Hotelling line along x ∈ [0, 1]. Let N i (r i , p i ) denote the demand that LSP i , i = 1, 2 experiences, given his choice of (r i , p i ). As explained above,
> 0 and most naturally
Furthermore, we assume that LSP i 's transportation cost per customer (i.e. per unit of freight) K i = K(N i , r i ) is a function of the level of demand N i , and delivery frequency r i . In particular, as argued before, the cost function shall exhibit the frequency effect (i.e.
∂K i ∂r i
> 0) as well as the community effect (i.e.
∂K i ∂N i < 0). For simplicity and expositional clearness, we will assume a cost function under which the marginal costs of delivery frequency, k > 0, are constant and under which the community effect is hyperbolic:
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are no further fixed costs of transportation. Thus, LSP's profits are given by
Logistics Customers: Logistics customers have individual preferences x ∈ [0, 1] and seek to minimize their costs C x , when selecting an exclusive LSP. More specifically, costs are constituted by three factors:
First, customers face preference costs T (x) that are individual and associated with the selection of a non-ideal LSP. Recall that the only two available logistics providers are located at the extremes of the customers preferences, i.e. LSP 1 , LSP 2 are located at x = 0, x = 1, respectively. Thus, the customers x ∈ (0, 1) experience a certain disutility when choosing any of the LSPs, because none of the available LSPs is perfectly aligned with their individual preference. In practice such preference costs often arise from loyalty and goodwill. In the model these costs capture any relevant aspect of LSP choice that is not explicitly captured elsewhere. In particular, customer x experiences preference costs of
where t measures the marginal preference costs that can be interpreted as the degree of differentiation, or likewise, as the degree of competition between the two LSPs. Second, as argued before, customers incur inventory holding costs which can be reduced by increasing the delivery frequency. In particular, we consider the inventory costs based on the EOQ-model with a symmetric unit holding-cost rate of h > 0. Depending on the delivery frequency r i , the average inventory holding costs are given by:
Third, customers pay a lump-sum payment of p i when choosing LSP i as their exclusive logistics service provider. This payment covers the costs for all delivery runs.
2 In summary, depending on the individual preference (x) and the characteristics of the chosen LSP (r i , p i ), each customer incurs total costs of
Competition between LSPs: The purpose of the present investigation is to analyze the competitive advantage (or disadvantage) of a logistics service provider that is associated with the ability to flexibly adapt delivery frequency to the market conditions (i.e. transportation costs, inventory holding costs and the degree of competition). Thus, in our model, we isolate the strategic impact of delivery frequency competition by allowing only one of the two LSPs to choose its delivery frequency. Let w.l.o.g. be LSP 1 the flexible LSP, whereas we fix the delivery frequency r 2 = 1 for LSP 2 . Alternatively, this limitation of the parameters can also be motivated by external constraints or strategic commitment. In the former case, it is assumed that LSP 2 is simply not able to chose its delivery frequency freely (e.g. due to technological limitations or regulation). In the latter case, it is considered that LSP 2 has credibly committed itself to delivering at a fixed frequency of r 2 = 1. As will be seen later, the effect of such strategic commitment is similar to that of strategic capacity choice (Dixit, 1980) , and has in fact been proven powerful in a number of industry contexts (cf. e.g. Leibner et al., 2009 ). In any case, the fixed choice of r 2 = 1 has similar implications as in a Stackelberg leader-follower market (Von Stackelberg and Peacock, 1952) , because LSP 1 will have to choose r 1 in response to a fixed r 2 . More precisely, the competition between the two LSPs is modeled by the following noncooperative three-stage game:
1. LSP 1 chooses r 1 (in response to r 2 = 1) 2. LSP 1 and LSP 2 simultaneously announce their prices p 1 and p 2 , respectively 3. Logistics customers choose the LSP which minimizes their total costs Notice the fact that delivery frequencies are chosen before prices (and not simultaneously), which reflects that prices are considered rather a short-term variable, while logistics service providers have to choose their delivery frequency for a longer term.
3
In the remainder of this section we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) of the outlined game by backwards induction. First we determine the demand of each logistics service provider, then solve the service providers' pricing problem and finally consider LSP 1 's optimal delivery frequency choice in the first stage.
Demand Allocation in the Third Stage
In the third stage customers are aquainted with the delivery frequencies and prices of the two LSPs and will choose the LSP that minimizes their total logistics costs from equation (5). Recall that consumers have an individual preference for the LSPs, such that customers that are located close to x = 0 have a strong preference for LSP 1 while customers that are located close to x = 1 prefer LSP 2 . Consequently, the demand for each LSP's service offering is determined by identifying the customerx, who is indifferent between purchasing the logistics service from LSP 1 or LSP 2 . By equating Cx 1 = Cx 2 we find thatx = 1 2 + h 4t
Since the mass of customers has been normalized to one, we can directly conclude that
In particular see that N * 1 increases with r 1 . Moreover, notice that the size of the preference cost parameter t directly relates to the fierceness of competition in the logistics market. Large values of t imply low competitive pressure. In the extreme case (t → ∞) each service provider acts as a local monopolist and has a market share of 1 2 . For very low values of t competition is very fierce and demand becomes very volatile. Therefore, in order to ensure an interior equilibrium and to rule out pathological cases, we assume for the remaining analysis that
3 Compare with Allon and Federgruen (2007) for a similar argument and timing. 4 The asterisk denotes equilibrium values now and in the following. 5 The exact derivation of this parameter constraint can be tracked in the appendix. In fact, for the positive analysis of the equilibrium it suffices to assume that t > 
Simultaneous Pricing Decisions in the Second Stage
In the second stage both logistics service providers choose their prices simultaneously to maximize their respective profit function (2), while anticipating the demand allocation in the third stage. It is straight forward to show that the following prices constitute the unique second-stage equilibrium:
Notice that the equilibrium level of prices hinges again on the level of competition or goodwill, t, in the market. In other words, the LSPs skim their market power. Moreover, it is easy to see that p * 1 = p * 2 = t for r 1 = r 2 = 1. Generally, it holds that p * 1 > p * 2 iff LSP 1 offers a higher delivery frequency than LSP 2 .
Delivery Frequency Competition in the First Stage
In the first stage, finally, LSP 1 will choose its frequency r 1 optimally under consideration of the subsequent two stages and given that r 2 = 1. Thus, LSP 1 seeks to solve the problem
which, after some rearranging, yields the following first order condition:
By implicit differentiation of the first order condition, and under consideration of the second order condition, we derive the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Comparative Statics). The optimal delivery frequency r * 1 exhibits the following comparative statics properties:
Intuitively, Lemma 1 states that LSP 1 will increase its delivery frequency as inventory holding costs become larger and reduce its delivery frequency as transportation costs increase. Furthermore, when customers goodwill, t, increases, LSP 1 will differentiate its delivery frequency less from r 2 = 1, which is offered by its competitor. Finally, Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 2 (Delivery Frequency Competition Equilibrium). In the delivery frequency competition game LSP 1 chooses its frequency r 1 strategically in response to a fixed frequency r 2 = 1 of LSP 2 . The equilibrium of this game can take one of three forms, depending on the size of the inventory holding costs in relation to the transport costs:
Case 3k ≤ h < 6k: In the unique subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium LSP 1 selects a lower delivery frequency than LSP 2 , i.e. r * 1 ∈ ( 1 2 , 1). Thereby LSP 1 makes less profits than LSP 2 , although it could make larger profits than LSP 2 if it were to choose r 1 ∈ (1, h 3k
).
Case h = 6k: In this case both competitors will offer the same delivery frequency r * 1 = r 2 = 1 and make equal profits of Π *
Case h > 6k: In the unique subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium LSP 1 selects a higher delivery frequency than LSP 2 , i.e. r * 1 ∈ (1, h 3k
). LSP 1 makes thereby higher profits than LSP 2 . ). Now consider Figure 1 , which relates to the case 3k ≤ h < 6k. Here, the profit function of LSP 1 reaches its maximum at r * 1 ≤ 1, i.e. at a delivery frequency for which LSP 1 makes less profit than LSP 2 . In particular, this case is characterized by the fact that LSP 1 could easily make a larger profit than LSP 2 if it were to choose r 1 ∈ (1, h 3k ]. However, this choice of r 1 would forfeit some of its own profits. Therefore, we call this the dilemma case. Here, the size of the inventory holding costs is small enough, such that the strategic (or non-strategic) commitment of LSP 2 pays off: LSP 1 's ability to flexibly choose a delivery frequency brings it at a disadvantage, because it is forced to select an optimal delivery frequency by which it is worse off than its otherwise symmetric competitor.
Next consider Figure 2 , which shows the logistics' providers profits for the case where inventory holding costs are rather large with respect to transportation costs (h > 6k). In this case, LSP 1 has an advantage over LSP 2 due to its ability to flexibly adapt to the market conditions. LSP 1 selects a delivery frequency that is larger than that of its competitor and makes thereby more profits than LSP 2 . Because inventory holding costs are high, customers prefer higher delivery frequencies. Therefore the strategic commitment of LSP 2 is not successful here, since LSP 1 can better satisfy the customers' needs. Nevertheless, LSP 1 will never offer a delivery frequency that is higher than h 3k .
The Socially Optimal Case
In the previous section we have derived the positive equilibrium of the delivery frequency competition game. However, from a normative point of view it is of interest to contrast the welfare properties of the equilibrium with those of the socially optimal case. More specifically, the social planner is to the solve the following maximization problem:
First, notice that prices constitute merely a transfer from the customers to the logistics providers and are therefore welfare neutral. Thus, the absolute level of the prices is irrelevant. However, recall from equation (6) that the difference of the prices p 2 − p 1 is relevant for welfare maximization because it has a direct impact on the market shares. Consequently, the maximization problem in (16) simplifies to the reduced maximization problem max
whose first order condition is
By comparing the coefficients of the left hand side of (18) with those from the first order condition of the private equilibrium (12), it is already evident that r + 1 will exhibit qualitatively the same comparative statics properties as r * 1 . The following proposition contrasts the private with the welfare optimum.
Proposition 4 (Welfare Optimum). In the welfare optimum, LSP 1 selects always a higher delivery frequency than in the private optimum, i.e. r , whereas this difference should be zero in the welfare optimum.
Proposition 4 reveals that LSP 1 will select an excessively low delivery frequency in the private optimum. The reason is that when the LSP s choose their optimal prices and LSP 1 its optimal delivery frequency, they do not fully internalize the social benefits to the customers. Albeit prices are per se welfare neutral, and thus cannot contribute to increasing social welfare, the difference in prices may still distort the customers' socially optimal choice of its exclusive LSP. Therefore, in the social optimum, the prices of the two LSP 's should be equal because this is the only case in which a customer's decision is not affected by prices. Moreover, in the private optimum, LSP 1 will generally choose its delivery frequency too low, because the transportation costs are overweighted in its private optimization. In other words, LSP 1 neglects some of the social benefits that a higher delivery frequency could exert on all of its customers for the sake of keeping its own transportation costs low.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the price and delivery frequency competition of logistics service providers in a supply chain. Service providers compete for customers who choose an exclusive LSP based on their individual preference, prices and inventory costs. The service provider which offers the higher delivery frequency is therefore more attractive to customers, because inventory holding costs are kept low. In reverse, higher delivery frequencies entail higher transportation costs for the LSPs (frequency effect), which is only partially offset by a community cost effect that captures the economies of scale from larger market share and synergies from increased load efficiency.
We consider a scenario in which only one of the two LSPs can choose its delivery frequency strategically. Our main result is that flexibility in frequency choice is only a strategic advantage for the LSP if customers' inventory holding costs are relatively high compared to transportation costs. In this case customers especially appreciate the high delivery frequencies and the flexible LSP is able to satisfy this demand. However, when inventory holding costs are comparably small with respect to the LSPs' transportation costs, the inflexible LSP is at an advantage. In this case the inflexibility in delivery frequency acts as a credible strategic commitment which the flexible LSP can only react to. Here, the inflexible LSP offers a higher delivery frequency in equilibrium and makes larger profits than its otherwise symmetric competitor. Furthermore, low inventory holding costs lead to a situation in which the LSP with the flexible delivery frequency faces the dilemma whether to choose his optimal delivery frequency and to make less profit than its competitor or to forfeit some of its own profits in order to make larger profits than the other LSP. Finally, we can show that the socially optimal delivery frequency is always higher than the delivery frequency that is selected in the competitive equilibrium because the flexible LSP does not fully internalize the social benefits that are associated with its increase in frequency.
The present framework is adequate in a transition situation, where some LSPs are able to offer flexible delivery frequencies whereas others are not.
However, future research should also take more advanced competition scenarios into account, where all LSPs are able to select their delivery frequency flexibility and strategically. Nevertheless, our results suggest that, depending on the market conditions, it may still be advantageous for one of the LSPs to strategically commit itself to an inflexible schedule in this situation.
Obviously, (20) can only be fulfilled if
Further, implicit differentiation of (19) yields
For (22) and (23) the lemma follows directly from (21). The lemma is also proven with respect to (24) iff
Inequality (25) . Substituting this later condition for r * 1 into (25) with equality, yields the new condition 21th + 2h
Notice that due to our worst case estimate of r * 1 , inequality (26) implies (25). It is easy to see that inequality (26) is satisfied for all t > 0 whenever h > , inequality (26) is satisfied only if
Recall from assumption (8) ). See that the interval in which the condition is not warranted can be arbitrarily small, since
. Moreover, this means that inequality (15) could only be violated if there exists the possibility that (25) is violated in this interval. To see whether this can be the case in the optimum, we substitute the border condition r * 1 = 3h 12t+2h
, at which (25) is zero, into the first order condition (12). After some rearranging we obtain the unique positive root
Now assuming t > h 3
, which is a weaker assumption than our global assumption (8), we can directly derive that h < . This violates the necessary condition for an interior equilibrium, h > 3k, which is derived in Lemma 5. Thus, for all t > . Provided t > h 3 this is ensured iff h ≥ 3k.
Proof. Let us denote the function that is described by the left hand side of the first order condition (12) as f (r 1 ) = α f r 3 1 − β f r 1 + h 2 , with α f = 36kt and β f = h 2 + 6ht. It is obvious that f (0) = h 2 > 0. Consequently, from the functional form of f (·), it is clear that f (·) always exhibits one real root at r 1 < 0 (see Figure 3) . Obviously, this root cannot be the solution to the corresponding maximization problem. In order for an interior equilibrium to the maximization problem to exist, we must provide a sufficient condition that there exists at least one further positive real root of f (·). First see from the functional form of f (·) again, that if there exists any further real root, it must be positive. Finally, recall that there exists at least two real roots of f (·), iff
Rearranging this inequality yields k ≤ Proof. In case h = 6k, the first order condition (12) simplifies to
It is easy to see that r * 1 = 1 satisfies the first order condition. Moreover, at this point the second order condition is fulfilled as well, since r *
. Finally, we show that r * 1 = 1 is the unique solution to the optimization problem. To see this, let ζ denote the left hand side of (30). It follows that Det(ζ) = (
) 3 . Furthermore, recall from Lemma 5 that t > k is a necessary and sufficient condition for an interior equilibrium given our assumptions. Thus, Det(ζ) > 0, which means that there exists only one real root of (30).
Lemma 7 (Interior Solution). For any t > h 3 ≥ k, there exists a unique interior solution, r * 1 > 0, that solves the maximization problem (11).
Proof. Lemma 6 proves that r * 1 is the unique interior solution for h = 6k. Also recall from the proof of Lemma 5 that there exists a unique positive real root of the first order condition (12) iff equation (29) holds with equality, i.e. Det(f ) = 0. This is precisely the case for k = k * max . Graphically, this corresponds to the case in Figure 3 where the local minimum of the function f is just zero. However, according to Lemma 1 we already know that ∂r * 1 ∂h > 0 and ∂r * 1 ∂k < 0. Thus, both an increase in h and a decrease in k would lead to an increase in r * 1 . Notice that both of these changes in the parameter values of h and k will results in Det(f ) < 0. In other words, the local minimum of f is pushed to a value below zero and f exhibits two positive real roots, as depicted in Figure 3 . It is now obvious, that only the rightmost root, i.e. r 1 satisfies the comparative statics results of Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, see that Π 1 = Π 2 at r 1 = {1, h 3k }. According to our assumptions, we know from Lemma 5 that 1 ≤ h 3k
. Therefore we can constrain the analysis to these cases. Notice that Π 1 > Π 2 in the interval r 1 ∈ (1, h 3k
). Furthermore, see that
from equation (19) simplifies to ∂Π 1 ∂r 1
(r 1 = 1) = h 6 − k (31)
when evaluated at r 1 = 1 and r 1 = h 3k
, respectively. In the case where 3k ≤ h < 6k, and under the assumption that t > h 3 it holds that ∂Π 1 ∂r 1
(r 1 = 1) < 0 and (r 1 = h 3k ) < 0. By Lemmas 1 and 7 it follows that r * 1 < 1. In summary, this proves the scenario as depicted in Figure 1 , i.e. for every h ∈ [3k, 6k) we can show that Π * 1 < Π * 2 and that there is an interval r 1 ∈ (1, : From the comparative statics results of Lemma 1, it is evident that the smallest r * 1 is obtained at the lowest values for h and t. Therefore, set h = 3k and t = 
The unique positive root of equation (33) is r 1 = 1 2 . In the alternative case of h > 6k, it holds that ∂Π 1 ∂r 1
(r 1 = 1) > 0 and 
wherex is as in equation (6). Differentiation of W with respect to p 1 and p 2 yields ∂W ∂p 1 = ∂W ∂p 2 = p 2 − p 1 2t .
Obviously, the first order condition can only be satisfied if p 1 = p 2 . It is easy to see that the second order condition for p 1 is satisfied as well. Thus, p 1 should be set at the same level as p 2 . The level of p 2 , however, is irrelevant. Proof of Proposition 4. First, we must provide that there exists a unique interior solution to the welfare optimization problem in (16). To this extend, denote the function that describes the left hand side of (18) as g. Notice that g has the same functional form as f and therefore the same reasoning as in Lemmas 5 and 7 applies. More specifically, the necessary and sufficient condition for an interior equilibrium is
This constraint is ensured for all h ≥ 3k iff t >
